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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH S1'EEL AND IRON COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.DONALD R. BOSCH AND PAUL M.
HOLT,
Def endarnts-Appellarnts.

Case No.

11759

BRIEF 0'F AP·PELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an interlocntory appeal from a decision of the
Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Merrill C. Faux,
.Jndge, presiding, \dwrein Judge Faux refused to grant
the motion to dismiss which had been filed by the defendants.
f-i'l'A 1'J£MENT OF FACTS
Donald R. Bosch is the Supervisor of Sales and
U st> Taxes, Auditing Division, lTtah State Tax Commission (R. 7), and Panl M. Holt is the Director of the Auditing- Di,·ision of tlw Utah State rrax Commission (R. 3),
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and it is their official duty to supervise the auditors of
the Utah State Tax Commission.
One of the audits performed by those auditors was
an audit of the books of Utah Steel and Iron Company,
and the auditors returned a report showing a total sales
tax due, including penalty and interest, of $16,865.45.
Upon receipt of this report, a form letter (R. 5 & 9) was
sent, dated March 12, 1969, which informed Utah Steel
and Iron Company of the findings of the Sales and Use
Tax Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, and clearly informed them that if they did not
agree with the proposed adjustments, they could submit
a request for redetermination at any time within ten days.
On June 18, 1969, another form letter (R. 6 & 10) was
sent which informed Utah Steel and Iron Company that
the proposed adjustment had been approved by the Ftah
State Tax Commission and constituted an assessment
which was due and payable unless a petitjon for redetermination was filed within ten days. The record does not
show whethe.r a petition for redetermination was filed
after either one of the letters, but such a petition would
not have any significance in this case, in which the tax
assessed is not in question, but only whether the defendants, in their individual capacity, are subject to this type
of action, and also whether they were entitled to have
their motion to dismiss granted.
Both letters (R. 5, 6, 9 & 10) had the name of Donald
R. Bosch typed in the upper right hand corner, and both
letters (R. 5, 6, 9 & 10) were purportedly signed by Paul
M. Holt and his signature was rubber stamped by members of his staff (R. 3).
2

Those two letters (R. 5, 6, 9 & 10) were the only
direct contact, either written or verbal, which the defendants had with the plaintiff. The only indirect contact was
the auditing of the books of the plaintiff by other auditors
of the Utah State Tax Commission. The uncontroverted
affidavits of the defendants clearly set forth the above
and also state that this was merely the normal procedure
followed for thousands of similar cases each year (R. 4 &
S). Those affidavits also state that all actions by the defendants (the mailing of two form letters) were performed in their official capacities, although the plaintiff,
by and through its president, filed an affidavit which
denied that the defendants were acting in the course of
their employment.
Following the sending of tht> two form letters, the
plaintiff filed this action in the district court
that:
''2. That on or about the 12th day of March,
1969 these defendants have conspired together to
harass, annoy, threaten and intimidate the plaintiff, and that since the said time they have unla1vfully threatened, intimidated, harassed and
annoyed the plaintiff, acting together and in concert 'vith each other until it has been necessary
for the plaintiff to and the plaintiff has discontinued its business and suffered damage in the
of $275,000.00, no part of which has been paid.
3. rrhat the said acts on the part of these defendants havt> lwen deliberate. malicious and without probable cause and the plaintiff has in addition thereto suffered punitive damages in the sum
of $25.000.00.'' (R.1)
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Immediately after the filing of the complaint, the defendants filed their answer, along with their affidavits
and Motion to Dismiss.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon the hearing of the motion to dismiss of the
defendants, that motion was denied, whereupon the defendants filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal,
which was granted by the Supreme Court of the State of

Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal is from the denial of the motion to dismiss of the defendants, and they seek a reversal of that
order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT SHOWED SUFFICIENT SPECIFIC FACTS TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS
NO GENUINE ISSUE FOR TRIAL, WHICH REQUIRED THE
GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION.

Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procednre provides, in part:

"If, on a motion asserting tlw defense numbered ( 6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, tlw motion shall he
treated as one for summary judgment and dis-

4

posed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rnle 56."
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants herein, affidavits of both defendants were
Jlrt'sented to, and not excluded by the court, as was a controverting affidavit signed by the president of the plaintiff corporation. Thus, the motion should clearly have
been treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proeedure.
Rnle 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
iirovides, in part, as follo\vs:
''\Yhen a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
h.'; nffidwcits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
smnmary judgment, if appropriate, shall be enttired against him." (Emphasis added)
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure
is to pierep tht> pleadings and to assess the proof in order
to SN'
there is a genuine need for a trial. 6
Jfnore's Ferleral Practice, 2nd Ed., Rule 56, p. 2022.
The affidavits filt>d by the defendants herein, and the contrn\'(-'l'ting affidavit filed by the defendant do not show
t!iat then' is a genuine issue for trial.
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Defendants' affidavits (R. 3 & 7) clearly show that
they have never had any personal contact of any type or
nature with the plaintiff, either written or oral, or over
the telephone, other than two form letters which were
sent to the plaintiff company and which merely stated that
an assessment had been made and if Utah Steel and Iron
Company did not agree with the assessment they should
petition for a redetermination within ten days. Those
letters do not show any possibility of the defendants "conspiring together to harass, annoy, threaten and intimidate the plaintiff," nor do they show that the actions of
the defendants were deliberate, malicious or without probable cause as was alleged in the complaint filed by the
plaintiff herein.
The affidavits filed by the defendants also stated
that any and all acts, specifically the acts of mailing two
letters to the plaintiff, were done in their official capacity
as employees of the Utah State Tax Commission, and
there is nothing which would indicate that there was any
action carried on in any other capacity than as employees
of the Utah State Tax Commission, other than the controverting affidavit of the plaintiff herein. However, the
affidavit of the plaintiff should clearly have been ignored
by the judge in hearing the motion, because of additional
provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows :
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on versmial knowfrdge, shall set forth siich
facts as would be admissible in evidence, cind dwll
show affirmatively that the affiant is compPtent
to testify to the matters stated there in .. , ( E111phasis added)
6

The controverting affidavit of the plaintiff states
that the defendants were not acting as agents or employees of the Utah State Tax Commission at the time an
audit was conducted on their books, records and affairs,
and it further denies that they were acting in the course
of their employment. However, that controverting affidavit is somewhat confusing in that it also states that
"at the present time the Utah State Tax Commission was
and is conducting an audit of the plaintiff's books, records
and affairs . . . " Thus, the plaintiff has admitted that
the audit was performed by the Utah State Tax Commission, but seems to assert that the actions of the defendants
in sending two form letters informing them of the results
of that audit were not within the scope of their employment. The affidavits filed by the defendants clearly show
that such is otherwise and under Rule 56( e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited above, the plaintiff
m 11st have perso·nal knowledge that the defendants are
not acting as agents or employees of the Tax Commission,
and he 1nust also be competent to testify to that matter
mid that testimony must be admissible into evidence to be
considered during a hearing on a motion to dismiss,
\\·hich is being considered as a motion for summary
jndgrnent..
This court has had occasion to consider the recently
arnPndt>d Utah rule in Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260,
c1::3G P.2d 1021 (1968). This was a slip and fall case in
which the defendant moved for summary judgment which
\\'as granted and this court affirmed on appeal. In the
plaintiff's complaint, she had alleged that there was
l':atn, slush and snO\\' on the floor of the defendant's cafe
7

which caused her to fall. She later amended the complaint
when she learned through depositions that there was no
water, slush or snow on the floor, to allege that the defendant was negligent in applying an excessive amount
of wax, which negligence had caused her fall. The defendant's answer denied that there was excessive wax on
the floor and the defendant moved for a summary judgment.
The plaintiff submitted an affidavit of an expert
who had run some tests on a sample floor and the affidavit of the expert had been to the effect that the floor
was dangerous because there was not enough wax on the
floor. This court pointed out that the motion for summary judgment was correctly granted because of the
discrepancy between the pleading which alleged excessive
wax and the plaintiff's affidavit which alleged not enough
wax was a basis for a dismissal. The problem was that
the affidavit did not support the allegations of the complaint. Id. at 263. See also: United American Insurance
Company v. Willey, 21 Utah 2d 279, 285, 44 P.2d 755
(1968). Defendants respectfnlly submit to this court
that the plaintiff herein has fa]led to substantiate the
allegations of its complaint jn its controverting affidavit
and that therefore the trial court should have accepted
the allegations of the defendants as to the nature and
types of contacts with plaintiff and granted the motion
for summary judgment. Defendants also respectfully
submit that there was no valid evjdence before the court
that they 'vere not acting in the scope of their employment, and the plaintiff was not competent to testify to
such a fact. The facts show that tlw defendants' only
8

actions were sending form letters commonly sent by the
Utah State Tax Commission and this was not denied by
the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is well aware that those
were the only actions performed by the defendants herein.
It is also respectfully submitted that, based on the affidavits of the defendants, and either with or without the
controverting affidavit of the plaintiff, there is no genuine issue for trial, and the defendants' motion to dismiss
should have been granted.
POINT II
PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE NOT LIABLE IN A PRIVATE
ACTION FOR GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY.

Although the plaintiff denies that the defendants
were acting in the scope of their authority, the facts clearly show othenvise. The affida\its filed by the dt•fendants
are nncontroverted in the statement that the only contact
hetween the plaintiff and defendant was two form letters
on \Yhieh the dt>ft'ndants' names \Yere typed and rubber
:'tam1wd. Th i0 is 11.11contr01;erted prim a f acie evidmice
that the defendants actPd in good faith within the scope
of their eniployment.

rr1w courts appear unanimous in their decisions that a
public officer is not liable in a private action for acts
twrfornwd in good faith within the scope of his authority.
()7 C.J.S., Officers, Section 125 et seq.
In K P1ley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 at 131, (1st Cir.
1U(i3). the court said:
9

"A long line of decisions has, both before and
since, recognized that in many instances 'the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible government officers against the harassment
and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded
damage suits based on acts done in the exercisl'
of their official responsibilities' outweighs 'the
protection of the individual citizen against damage
caused by oppressin' or malicious action on the
part of public officers.'" (Emphasis addt>d)
As Chief Judge Learned Hand said in Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d (2nd Circ. 1949), Cert. den. 339 U.S. 949,
70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 19G3, at p. 581:
"The justification [for denying
** ''
is that it is impossible to know whether the claim
is well fonndPd until the case has been tried, and
that to submit all officials, the innocent as "·ell as
the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to tht> inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties."
In Kelley i:. Dunne, supra, at 132-133, the court sPt
forth the following common denominators in disallo\\·ing
pri,·ate suits against public officPrs.
1.

The conduct of the dt>fondant-official was within
the scope of agPncy powers.

2.

Tht> act complaim'd of was prima faciP in aecordwith tlw offieer's duties and enstoman·
beha,·ior.

3.

Tlw frep PX.Pre1tw of the public function ontwPighed privatP intPresb.
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The Montana Supreme Court has held that immunity
from personal liability is not extended to the official for
his own sake but because the public inh•rest requires full
inde1wndence of action and decision on his part, uninfluenced by any fear or apprehension of consequences
personal to himself. JI einecke v. 1llcFa.rland, 206 P.2d
1012, 1014 (1949).

In Industrial Comniission v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz.
App. 100, 423 P.2d 375 (1967), the Court said:
"The very purpose of the rule of immunity
afforded to public officers was to avoid potential
lwrassmeut and/or coercion by means of a threat
of a lawsuit." (Emphasis added)
One of the best statements of the rule of law which
;-;pt>aks against tlw plaintiff in thP instant case is in Lipman c. Brisl){UU' Flemrntary School Dist., S.C. of California, 359 P.2d 465, at 4(i7 (1961).
"Becausf• of important policy considnations,
the rule ltas become established that government
officials arP not personally liable for their discretionary acts \\·ithin the scope of their authority
PH'n though it is alleged that their conduct was
malicious. (Citations omitted.) The subjection of
officials, tlw innoct>nt a:-; well as the guilty, to the
hurdPn of a trial and to the danger of its outcome
would impair tlwir zeal in the performance of their
fnnctions, and it is better to leave tlw injur:» unthan to subject h01wst officials to the
eonstant drPad of retaliation."
1

Th0 Utah Supreme Court recently considered this
prnhlum whc11 construction of a junior high school resultc·d in destruction of an irrigation ditch and landoWJ1ers in

11

Utah's Granite School District instituted suit against the
school district and the individual board nwmbers. The
defendants' motion to dismiss was granted by the Third
District Court, and the Supreme Court affirmed:
''In common with other public officials, they
[school board members] have authority to do
whatever is reasonably necessary in carrying out
the duties imposed upon tht•m. It would be quite
impractical and unfair to require them to act at
their own risk. This would not
be disruptive
of the proper functioning of public institutions,
but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and
responsible persons from accepting responsibilities of public office. Accordingly, it is the settled
policy of the law that when a public official acts i 11
good faith, believing what he does to be within
the scope of his authority and in the b11e of his
duty, he is not liable for damages even if he makes
a mistake in the exercise of his judgment.''
Anderson 1:. Granifr School Di..,frict, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413
P.2d 597 (1969) at 599. Citing: Roe i-. Lundstrom, 89
Utah 520, 57P.2d1128 (1936).
The case at hand appears to be one of the specific
type for which the rule is intended, i.e., this case appears
to be a vindictive and ill-founded law snit which was filed
purely for harassment, intimidation and/or coercion
of public officials to J>rPvent any future audits of the
plaintiff hy tlw Utah f;tab,• Tax Commission, or to force
a pnhlic agency to eomprnmise a just and lawful dPbt of
that agency
offrring to dismiss the spurious action
in exchangP for a compromise of the just deht (as has
heretofore lw<·n off Pr<'d in this case). rl,o iwrmit snits
of this
wonld be tantamount to blackmail and
shonld not b<-> permittt>d, mneh less eneom·agt>d.
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POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT A VOID THE IMP ACT OF
GOVERNMENT AL IMMUNITY BY SUING A PUBLIC OFFICER IN A PRIVATE SUIT.

The doctrine named above in Point II, that a public
officer is not liable for his good faith acts performed
within the scope of his authority, is a form of the commonlaw doctrine of sovereign immunity. That doctrine, of
course, prevents any private suit against the State or
FedPral Governments without the consent of the Government to be sued. Hmvever, many attempts have been
madP to circnrnvent this rule by bringing the action
against the individual, employee, or public official to indirectly
'.drnt could not be achieved directly.
Because of this, the courts subsequently adopted the doctrine that the impact of governmental immunity could
not be avoided b:-; bringing the suit against the t'rnployee
or imblic official in his individual capacity. This principal
and thP reason therefor are well explained in ] 60 A.L.R.
t ')3').J, wl1erem
. it
. says:
..
33 ')_a.,_),
"Howen'r, while a suit against state or FedPral officials is not
a suit against the
statt•, within tlw rule of immunity of the state from
suit without its consent, that rule cannot be
evaded by bringing an action nominally against
an officer or a board, commission, or department
in his or its official capacity when the real claim is
against the sovereign itself, who is the party vitally
interested. \Vhile
in determining whether
a state was a party to controvPrsy, the court would
l0ok
to the rpcord to see who were the parties,
that is, the court would not considPr the state a
party nnless nominally so, this view has long since
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been discarded. The rule is now well settled that a
suit against an officer as representing the soverwhere the state, aleign in action and
though not a party to the record, is the real party
against which relief is sought, and where a judgment for the plaintiff, although nominally against
the officer as an individual, could operate to control the action of the state or subject it to liability,
is to be deemed a suit against the state, and is not
maintainable unless the state has consented to be
sued."

It is respectfully submitted that the case at hand
is almost identical to the principals set forth above. Although the State Tax Commission is not a party of
record, if a judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants for their simple act of sending
out two standard form letters from the governmental
agency for which they \Vere employed, it would certainly
act to control the actions of the state, and all state employees would be hesitant to send out any official correspondence for apprehension of being pen;onally liable.
This would be especially true for persons charged with
'the somev,:hat unpleasant task of collecting delinquent
taxes due to the State of Utah, as are the defendants.
ThP Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed the
above principals in Sheffield i:. Turner, 21 F.2d 314, 445
P.2cl 367, (1968), which was a private action against the
\Varden of the Utah State Prison by an inmate who had
heen stabbed by a fellow prisoner. The complaint alleged
that the \,Varden had permitted his employees to super-
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vise the inmates in a negligent manner, which enabled the
fellow prisoner to enter the plaintiff's quarters and stab
him. Justice Crockett wrote the opinion of the Utah
Snpreme Court and stated:
''The anciently established and almost uni,-ersally recognized general rule which this court
has consistently announced and adhered to is that
the government, its agencies and officials performing go'vernmental functions are protected by sovereign imrnunity." (Emphasis added).
'Che anthorities cite<l by the Court for that statement
"Sehy v. Salt Lake City, -H l-:-tah 535, 125 P.
(i91, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 915; Bingham v. Board of
Education of Ogden, 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432;
Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d
SOO; SpringTille Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d
100, 349 P.2d 137.''
Tlw Conrt did dPln· into the question of whether the
"Ctah GovernmPntal Immunity Act (Sec. 63-30-1, et seq.,
1·tah Code Ann., 1953) had any influence on the above
::-;tated principals and rases, lrnt the conrt finally condnded, at p. 3fi9:
··upon our eonsideration of the various aspects of thP problem and an examination of the
anthoritiPs which han• dealt with it, it is onr
opinion that in a situation such as this, ... the
1u1rde11 und other prison officrrs are protected
lJy thf' doctrine of soverei_qn im1111111ity against
claims of ·11egli9ence so long as they are acting in
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good faith and within the scope of their duties,
and that they could ,not be held liable unless they
were guilty of some conduct which transcended
the bounds of good faith performance of their
ditty by a wilful or malicious wrongful act which
they knew or should know would resitlt in injitry ...
The Court indicated that the reason for its holding was
"the imperative need for those in a supervisory capacity
to have reasonable freedom to discharge (their) burdensome responsibilities ... If such officials are too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything, ... capable persons would
be discouraged from taking such public positions." Id. at
369.
The above reasons are also clearly present in the case
at hand, and it is respectfully submitted that the Court
should hold similarly to Sheffield v. Titrner, supra.
CONCLUSION
For the purpose of the defendants' motion to dismiss,
the facts are not in controversy, and based on those facts
there was no claim upon which relief could be granted.
rrhe sending of two form letters from a governmental
office is clearly not a sufficient action to establish a tortious claim upon ·which relief could be granted.
Even if the content of those letters had maliciously
slandered the plaintiff, which seems inconceivable in this
rasc, the record shows no bad faith in the defendants
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performance of those acts, and those acts were clearly
in the scope of their authority making them immune
from liability. The law is clear that the impact of governmental immunity cannot be avoided by suing a public
officer in a private suit, and it is respectfully submitted
that the motion to dismiss should have been granted.
Respectfully submitted,

YERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorneys for Defendants
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